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ON JANUARY 27, 1973 CONSCRIPTION OF MEN INTO THE U.S. 
military ended, and on June 30, 1973 the law authorizing conscription 
expired. Conscription, henceforth referred to as the draft, had been in 
existence since 1940, except for a period from March 1947 to June 1948. 
Richard Nixon had made ending the draft an issue during his presidential 
campaign against Hubert Humphrey, a strong proponent of the draft. 
Nixon even went so far as to devote a whole radio address to his proposal 
to end the draft on CBS on October 17, 1968. It was around that time that 
I started following the issue closely, reading extensively in the popular and 
academic literature about the politics, economics, and history of the draft. 
Despite President Nixon’s apparent commitment to volunteerism, as it was 
then called, almost no one I talked to between 1968 and 1970 believed that 
the draft would end soon. A powerful coalition of southern Democrats, in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives, along with some 
Republicans and northern Democrats, strongly supported the draft. 
Political opposition to the draft seemed scattered, consisting mainly of 
various statist and conservative Republicans and some statist Democrats. 
Yet, less than five years after Nixon’s radio address, the draft was over. 
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Thirty-two years later, it has not reappeared, despite a serious effort in 1979 
to bring it back.  
How did it end so quickly? I believe there are two reasons. First, 1972 
was the first year in which people aged 18 to 20 were allowed to vote. 
President Nixon probably sensed a base of support among these new 
voters, and many of the males in this group would presumably appreciate 
not being drafted. The second and, I believe, more important reason is that 
economists in the mid to late 1960s did extensive work documenting the 
tremendous human cost of the draft and laying out a systematic and strong 
case against the draft and for an all-volunteer force. Economists from 
across the political spectrum, but especially from the classical-liberal, pro-
market end, were very active in this work.  
A caution to the reader: Those who share the late George Stigler’s 
view that economists have nothing to tell policymakers that they don’t 
already know will not, most likely, be persuaded that economists have 
influenced draft policy. I have no way of proving, beyond a doubt, that 
economists have, in fact, had such an effect. However, my contention that 
they have is based on my close observations of the draft debate that has 
taken place over many years. What follows is not a rigorous test of the 
effect of economists on policy, but rather a story about their involvement, 
along with some documentation.  
One of the first empirical studies of the economics of the draft and 
of ending the draft was done by Walter Oi (1967a, 1967b), an economics 
professor then at the University of Washington and later at the University 
of Rochester’s Graduate School of Management. In his study published in 
the Sol Tax volume (Oi 1967b), Oi distinguished clearly between the 
budgetary cost of military manpower and the economic cost. Oi granted the 
obvious, that a military of given size could be obtained with a lower 
budgetary cost if the government used the threat of force to get people to 
join—that is, used the draft. But, he noted, the hidden cost of this was the 
loss of well-being among draftees and draft-induced volunteers. Using some 
empirical methods that were sophisticated for their day, Oi estimated the 
loss to draftees and draft-induced volunteers and found it quite high— 
between $826 million and $1.134 billion. While this number might seem 
low today, Oi’s data were in mid-1960s dollars. Inflation-adjusted to 2005, 
the losses would be $4.8 billion to $6.6 billion. 
Oi’s study was one in a long line of articles by economists who used 
empirical methods to estimate the labor supply of first-term enlistees. Other 
economists who contributed to the literature at the time were Stuart Altman 
(1969), the late David Bradford (1968), Alan Fechter (Altman and Fechter 
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1967), Anthony C. Fisher (1969), and W. Lee Hansen, and Burton 
Weisbrod (1967). Their articles appeared in such prestigious economics 
journals as the American Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
which, in this author’s view, were more open to publishing articles on 
important policy issues than they are today. Although it was sometimes not 
clear whether the economists who did the empirical studies were against the 
draft, their evidence made a strong case that an all-volunteer force was quite 
viable, even in the midst of a fairly intense war such as the Vietnam War. 
One had the feeling also that the economists who wrote about it were, to a 
man, against the draft.  
In my opinion, just as important as the academic-journal articles, 
were the activities by economists making the case against the draft to a 
general audience. The most famous economist in this category was Milton 
Friedman. In December 1966, various prominent and less-prominent 
academics, politicians, and activists were invited to a four-day conference at 
the University of Chicago. Papers were commissioned and the people who 
wrote them gave summaries, after which the discussion was open to all. 
Fortunately, the discussion was transcribed. The papers and discussions 
appear in the Sol Tax volume referenced earlier, which came out the 
following year. The invitees included two young anti-draft Congressmen, 
Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wisconsin) and Donald Rumsfeld (R-Illinois), and 
one pro-draft Senator, Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). Also attending 
were pro-draft anthropologist Margaret Mead and anti-draft economists 
Milton Friedman and Walter Oi. Friedman gave the general economic and 
philosophical case for a voluntary military in his presentation, “Why Not a 
Voluntary Army?” Reading through the whole Sol Tax volume, with all the 
papers and transcripts of the discussion, I had the sense that there was a 
coalescing of views over the four-day conference, as people from various 
parts of the ideological spectrum found that they shared a strong antipathy 
to the draft and that the economists had a surprisingly strong economic 
case against it. Friedman’s speech and his various comments at the 
conference still make compelling reading. One of his best rhetorical 
flourishes was his criticism of the charge that those who advocate ending 
the draft are advocating a “mercenary” army. Friedman said: 
 
Now, when anybody starts talking about this [an all-
volunteer force] he immediately shifts language. My army 
is “volunteer,” your army is “professional,” and the 
enemy’s army is “mercenary.” All these three words mean 
exactly the same thing. I am a volunteer professor, I am a 
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mercenary professor, and I am a professional professor. 
And all you people around here are mercenary professional 
people. And I trust you realize that. It’s always a puzzle to 
me why people should think that the term “mercenary” 
somehow has a negative connotation. I remind you of that 
wonderful quotation of Adam Smith when he said, “You 
do not owe your daily bread to the benevolence of the 
baker, but to his proper regard for his own interest.” And 
this is much more broadly based. In fact, I think 
mercenary motives are among the least unattractive that 
we have. (quoted in Tax 1967, 366) 
 
Next to this passage in my dog-eared version of the Sol Tax book, 
which I purchased over 30 years ago, I wrote one word: “Wow!” This is 
rhetoric at its best, a tight argument passionately stated.  
Two of Friedman’s comments about this conference are worth 
noting. Writing some 30 years later, Friedman noted that the 74 invited 
participants “included essentially everyone who had written or spoken at all 
extensively on either side of the controversy about the draft, as well as a 
number of students” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 377). Friedman’s other 
comment is worth citing: 
 
I have attended many conferences. I have never attended 
any other that had so dramatic effect on the participants. A 
straw poll taken at the outset of the conference recorded 
two-thirds of the participants in favor of the draft; a 
similar poll at the end, two-thirds opposed. I believe that 
this conference was the key event that started the ball 
rolling decisively toward ending the draft. (Friedman and 
Friedman 1998, 378) 
 
Other economists were also making the philosophic and economic 
case for ending the draft. One notable group was a group of students and 
newly-minted graduates from the University of Virginia Ph.D. program in 
economics. They were studying, or had studied, under James Buchanan, 
Gordon Tullock, the late G. Warren Nutter, Leland Yeager, and other 
notable economists at that university at the time. This group included James 
C. Miller III, later the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and 
director of the Office of Management and Budget, Mark V. Pauly, now a 
prominent health economist at Wharton, and Robert Tollison and Cotton 
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M. Lindsay, two well-published economists at Clemson University.1 This 
young group of economists took the initiative of putting together a book of 
essays, Why the Draft? The Case for the Volunteer Army (1968). This was one of 
the first books on the draft that I read. I picked it up at a used book store in 
Winnipeg in the late 1960s, read it on the bus to and from the University of 
Winnipeg, and came away realizing that the U.S. tradition was one of 
volunteerism rather than conscription, and also understanding, for the first 
time, the strong economic arguments against the draft. The book, edited by 
James C. Miller III, had a preface written by Edward Brooke, at the time a 
Republican U.S. Senator from Massachusetts. Miller told me once that the 
book sold out its 30,000-copy print run and that Penguin, the publisher, 
dragged its heels and never printed more, despite the obvious demand. 
Another important group that worked on the nuts and bolts of the 
draft, and of the transition to an all-volunteer force, consisted of the various 
economists working for Nixon’s Gates Commission—that is, the 
President’s Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force. Usually when 
presidents appoint commissions, they do so for one of two reasons: (1) to 
“punt” on a controversial issue by buying time and hoping it will go away or 
(2) to get a blue-ribbon group to come out in favor of something on which 
there is a consensus among experts, but on which the public is divided. But 
President Nixon’s commission fit neither of these. First, had Nixon been 
trying to punt, he would not have formed the commission on March 27, 
1969, less than three months after his inauguration. Second, there was not a 
consensus among the experts: there was a division of views within 
academia, within the military, and within the political establishment. As 
Milton Friedman, one of the 15 members of the Commission noted, the 
members of the Commission were evenly divided: five were avowed 
proponents of the draft; five were avowed opponents; and five were 
uncommitted.2 This division of views came as a surprise to William H. 
                                                                                       
1 The other two were Thomas D. Willett, later a deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. 
Treasury and now an economist at Claremont and Joseph M. Scolnick, Jr., a political 
scientist. 
2 The members were Chairman Thomas S. Gates, Jr., former secretary of defense; Alfred 
Gruenther, former supreme Allied commander, Europe; Lauris Norstad, former supreme 
Allied commander, Europe; W. Allen Wallis, an economist and president of the University 
of Rochester; economist Alan Greenspan; Milton Friedman; Thomas Curtis, former 
Republican congressman from Missouri; Frederick Dent, president of Mayfair Mills; 
Crawford Greenewalt, chairman of the finance committee of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and 
Co.; Stephen Herbits, a student at Georgetown University Law Center; Theodore Hesburgh, 
president of the University of Notre Dame and chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights; Jerome Holland, president of the Hampton Institute; John Kemper, headmaster of 
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Meckling, the executive director of the Gates Commission and an 
economist who was dean of the University of Rochester’s Graduate School 
of Management. In a speech in early 1979 in which he reminisced briefly 
about his time on the Gates Commission, Meckling said, “I thought I 
would be estimatin’ supply curves.”3 In other words, Meckling thought he 
would be planning how to end conscription. His thought was 
understandable, as President Nixon’s charge to the Commission read, in 
part, as follows: 
 
I have directed the Commission to develop a 
comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and 
moving toward an all-volunteer armed force. The 
Commission will study a broad range of possibilities for 
increasing the supply of volunteers for service, including 
increased pay, benefits, recruitment incentives and other 
practicable measures to make military careers more 
attractive to young men. (Nixon’s statement of March 27, 
1969.) 
 
Instead, Meckling found himself not just overseeing a large research 
project, but also having to make the case with some Commission members 
for getting rid of the draft. Meckling did the job well, and one of his 
favorite passages of the Commission’s report—which he wrote and enjoyed 
quoting—was the opening paragraphs of Chapter 3, which was titled, 
“Conscription is a Tax.” Here are those paragraphs: 
 
Any government has essentially two ways of accomplishing 
an objective whether it be building an interstate highway 
system or raising an army. It can expropriate the required 
tools and compel construction men and others to work 
until the job is finished or it can purchase the goods and 
manpower necessary to complete the job. Under the first 
alternative, only the persons who own the property seized 
or who render compulsory services are required to bear the 
expense of building the highway or housing project. They 
                                                                                      
the Phillips Academy; Jeanne Nobel, a professor at New York University and vice-president 
of the National Council of Negro Women; and Ray Wilkins, executive director of the 
NAACP. 
3 Meckling, who was my boss at the time, loved to drop his “g’s” at the end of “ing” words. 
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pay a tax to finance the project, albeit a tax-in-kind. Under 
the second alternative, the cost of the necessary goods and 
services is borne by the general public through taxes raised 
to finance the project. 
 
Conscription is like the first alternative—a tax-in-kind. A 
mixed force of volunteers and conscripts contains first-
term servicemen of three types—(1) draftees, (2) draft-
induced volunteers, and (3) true volunteers. Draftees and 
draft-induced volunteers in such a force are coerced into 
serving at levels of compensation below what would be 
required to induce them to volunteer. They are, in short, 
underpaid. This underpayment is a form of taxation. Over 
200 years ago, Benjamin Franklin, in commenting on a 
judicial opinion concerning the legality of impressments of 
American merchant seamen, recognized the heart of the 
issue, and even estimated the hidden tax. He wrote: 
 
“But if, as I suppose is often case, the sailor who is pressed 
and obliged to serve for the defence of this trade at the 
rate of 25s. a month, could have ₤3.15s, in the merchant’s 
service, you take from him 50s. a month; and if you have 
100,000 in your service, you rob that honest part of society 
and their poor families of ₤250,000. per month, or three 
millions a year, and at the same time oblige them to hazard 
their lives in fighting for the defence of your trade; to the 
defence of which all ought indeed to contribute, (and 
sailors among the rest) in proportion to their profits by it; 
but this three millions is more than their share, if they did 
not pay with their persons; and when you force that, 
methinks you should excuse the other. 
 
“But it may be said, to give the king’s seamen merchant’s 
wages would cost the nation too much, and call for more 
taxes. The question then will amount to this; whether it be 
just in a community, that the richer part should compel the 
poorer to fight for them and their properties for such 
wages as they think fit to allow, and punish them if they 
refuse? Our author tells us it is legal. I have not law enough 
to dispute his authority, but I cannot persuade myself it is 
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equitable.” (Report of the President’s Commission 1970, 23-
24) 
 
 During its ten months of work, the Gates Commission hired a 
number of economists to estimate supply curves for officers and enlistees, 
the effects of bonuses on retention, the effect of various factors on re-
enlistments, determinants of labor turnover costs in the military, the size of 
the conscription “tax,” and productivity of the U.S. military recruiting 
system, to name a few. The roster of people working on the Commission 
studies included Walter Y. Oi, Robert J. Barro, Larry A. Sjastaad, Harry 
Gilman, Alan Fechter, Stuart Altman, Ronald N. Hansen, and J. Huston 
McCulloch. The four directors of research for the whole project were Stuart 
Altman, Harry J. Gilman, David Kassing, and Walter Y. Oi. The three 
consulting organizations involved in the project were the Center for Naval 
Analyses, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Rand Corporation. 
The Commission also examined non-economic issues. Excellent 
studies on the U.S. historical experience with volunteerism and the draft 
(done by John L. Rafuse) and on conscription and constitutional law (by 
David M. Stigler) are among the non-economic issues written up in a logical 
and compelling way. After more than 30 years of having read dozens of 
government reports and the studies behind them, I can safely say that the 
quality of these studies is about the highest I’ve seen. That’s a tribute both 
to the economists and others who did the studies and to the four 
economists who supervised them.   
So, as you can see, Meckling was not completely off the mark in 
thinking that he would be estimating supply curves. But he also engaged in 
debate. I was not able to interview Meckling for this article, but I did 
interview his widow, Becky Meckling, a few months after his death in 
1998.4 One debate from her husband’s days stood out in her mind—one, 
she said, that had delighted Bill. The Commission had held hearings and 
what had Meckling beaming, she said, was an exchange between Milton 
Friedman and one of the witnesses, General William Westmoreland, who 
had been the commander of the troops in Vietnam and was, at the time, 
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. I had heard Bill tell this story a few times, 
and the day stood out in Milton Friedman’s mind too. Friedman reports the 
dialogue in his memoirs, Two Lucky People, co-authored with his wife, Rose: 
 
                                                                                       
4 I got to know Bill and Becky Meckling in the late 1970s, when Bill was the dean of the 
business school at the University of Rochester and I was an assistant professor there. 
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In the course of his testimony, he made the statement that 
he did not want to command an army of mercenaries. I 
stopped him and said, ‘General, would you rather 
command an army of slaves?’ He drew himself up and 
said, ‘I don’t like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred 
to as mercenaries.’ But I went on to say, ‘If they are 
mercenaries, then I, sir, am a mercenary professor, and 
you, sir, are a mercenary general; we are served by 
mercenary physicians, we use a mercenary lawyer, and we 
get our meat from a mercenary butcher.’ That was the last 
that we heard from the general about mercenaries. 
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 380). 
 
In those same memoirs, Friedman reminisced about the Gates 
commission’s meetings and effectiveness: 
 
Tom Gates was a splendid, open-minded, even-handed 
chairman, who gradually shifted his position to become a 
convinced supporter of an all-volunteer army. The same 
thing happened to the other two men from the military, Al 
Gruenther and Lauris Norstad. Though evenly split at the 
outset, we ended by submitting a unanimous report, save 
only for Roy Wilkins, who was prevented by illness from 
participating in the last three months of our proceedings 
and therefore decided to abstain. (Friedman and Friedman 
1998, 379) 
 
One economist particularly worth noting is Martin Anderson, a long-
time senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, who joined Richard Nixon’s 
campaign for president in 1967. Anderson wrote the anti-draft speech that 
Nixon gave on CBS radio during the 1968 election. As an adviser to 
President Nixon, Anderson helped choose the members of Nixon’s 
commission on the all-volunteer force. My educated guess is that without 
Anderson, the Commission would not have happened. And I’m quite 
confident that without Anderson, it would not have had, as members, so 
many prestigious economists. 
One other economist worth noting, both for his work on the 
Commission and for his public opposition to the draft, is the 
aforementioned Allen Wallis. Wallis had been a top adviser to President 
Eisenhower and was later to be the Undersecretary of State for Economic 
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Affairs under President Reagan’s Secretary of State, George P. Shultz. On 
November 11, 1968, while president of the University of Rochester, Wallis 
was invited to give a speech in Rochester to the Monroe County branch of 
the American Legion on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. His speech is a 
model of how to approach an audience when you have an important, 
controversial message to give and you think your audience might disagree 
with you. Wallis spent the first half of the speech connecting with his 
audience, telling them his reminiscences of being a young child at the end 
of World War I, telling them his thoughts about war and foreign policy, and 
generally assuring them that although he wished for peace, he was not a 
pacifist. Then he turned on a dime, saying: 
 
There is one measure we can take and should take 
immediately that would do much to resolve the dilemma 
that arises because, on the one horn, one of America’s 
most fundamental—and also most admirable—
characteristics is repugnance for war and, on the other 
horn, the ability to wage war is essential to the preservation 
of freedom. 
 
The measure I propose will, I fear, shock some of you. I 
respectfully request that you nevertheless hear me out and 
think over my proposal carefully, rather than reject it out 
of hand. It is not a view that I have come to lightly or 
recently, but one I have held for over twenty years. It is 
not original with me, nor is it without strong support from 
many respectable citizens of unquestionable patriotism. 
 
A step that would do much toward resolving our dilemma 
is to abolish the draft—abolish it completely, lock, stock, 
and barrel; abolish it immediately, with no ifs, ands, or 
buts. (Wallis 1976, 46) 
 
Wallis went on to advocate getting rid of the draft within 90 days of 
incoming President Nixon’s inauguration. He spent the last half of the 
speech laying out the various arguments against the draft. He also dealt with 
the “mercenary” issue that Milton Friedman was later to address, quoting 
his labor economist colleague Harry J. Gilman. Gilman had asked, “Why . . . 
are officers who are encouraged to enter and to remain in the service by 
reasonably high levels of pay called ‘dedicated career men’ but privates who 
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would volunteer when they too received higher levels of pay called 
‘mercenaries’?” Wallis’s speech, incidentally, was covered positively in The 
Nation, a major left-wing publication (The Nation 1968).  
When I read the speech in 1976, I wondered how the audience had 
reacted, but I didn’t get my answer until a day in 1979, when I had lunch 
with Wallis. I expected him to say, “I got some polite applause.” Polite 
applause would have been a victory with such an explosive issue in 1968, 
the peak of the Vietnam War. Instead, he answered that he had received a 
standing ovation. Wallis later gave me a copy of a letter he had written to a 
Republican friend, John A. Perkins, telling of the reaction. The following 
are excerpts from that letter: 
 
You ask about the reception [given the speech.] It was 
considerably better than I anticipated. I am not sure that 
“standing ovation” is quite accurate as a description of 
their response, but it is a fact that they all stood up while 
they clapped. The chairman of the meeting turned to me 
and said, “I agree with you completely: I have sons.” One 
member of the audience shook my hand as I was leaving 
and said, “I admire your courage!” Two Negroes stopped 
me, clasped my hands warmly, looked deep in my eyes for 
more than five but less than ten seconds, seemed to 
convey a feeling of deep emotion, but said scarcely 
anything. (Wallis 1969) 
 
 Whenever the military has had trouble recruiting, advocates of the 
draft, such as Northwestern University sociologist Charles Moskos, come 
out in favor of bringing back the draft. When they start to push for the 
draft, the front line of defense against them is still economists. This was 
evidenced in 1979 and 1980, when high inflation caused a serious drop in 
real pay and consequent increase in difficulty meeting recruiting quotas. Of 
all the threats to bring back the draft in the last 32 years, the threat in 1979-
1980 was the most serious. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) held hearings 
with the goal of building support for the draft and, at least, registration for a 
future draft. Various economists fought the good fight against this move, 
including Stanley Horowitz, Sam Kleinman, and Chris Jehn, then 
economists at the Center for Naval Analyses, Lee Mairs, a Navy 
Commander, at the time the chief manpower economist for the U.S. Navy, 
and John T. Warner, an economics professor at Clemson University. Martin 
Anderson organized an important conference on the draft at the Hoover 
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Institution in November 1979 and invited the top proponents and 
opponents of the draft (Anderson 1982). What impresses me about literally 
all of them is their moral certitude in opposing the draft, and that none of 
them opposed the draft just because they happened to be vulnerable to it 
themselves or had a son who would be. Some of them, such as Hoover’s 
Martin Anderson, have no children. Chris Jehn, an assistant secretary of 
defense in the first Bush administration, later an associate director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, and now a vice-president at Cray Inc., has 
only a daughter. Walter Oi has two daughters. 
Also, many other economists signed the following “Economists’ 
Statement in Opposition to the Draft,” which I wrote and circulated in 
1980: 
 
We, the undersigned, oppose moves toward the 
reimposition of the draft. The draft would be a more 
costly way of maintaining the military than an all-volunteer 
force. Those who claim that a draft costs less than a 
volunteer military cite as a savings the lower wages that the 
government can get away with paying draftees. But they 
leave out the burden imposed on the draftees themselves. 
Since a draft would force many young people to delay or 
forego entirely other activities valuable to them and to the 
rest of society, the real cost of military manpower would 
be substantially more than the wages draftees would be 
paid. Saying that a draft would reduce the cost of the 
military is like saying that the pyramids were cheap because 
they were built with slave labor. (Economists’ Statement 
1981, 2) 
 
The statement was published as a full-page ad in Libertarian Review, 
Inquiry, and The Progressive. Among the prominent economists who signed 
were Kenneth Boulding, Harold Demsetz, Milton Friedman, Alan 
Greenspan, David Friedman, Donald McCloskey, William Meckling, Allen 
H. Meltzer, James C. Miller III, William A. Niskanen, Mancur Olson, Sam 
Peltzman, Murray Rothbard, Jeremy J. Siegel, Vernon Smith, Beryl W. 
Sprinkel, Jerome Stein, and James L. Sweeney. 
In the years since 1980, whenever the draft issue has arisen, 
economists have been there to fight it. Such economists include Paul 
Hogan, a specialist in military manpower who has worked for various 
373                                                                                  VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2, AUGUST 2005 
DAVID R. HENDERSON 
manpower research groups, Steven Cylke, an economist with the U.S. Navy, 
and the aforementioned Chris Jehn and John Warner. 
What can we learn from the push by economists to end the draft? 
Public-choice economists emphasize the role of special interests, and their 
views should not be dismissed lightly. But ideas and ideals matter, too. 
Before the draft was eliminated, most Americans had trouble imagining a 
country without one, given that it had been in existence for 31 of the 
previous 33 years. And yet we have now gone without a draft for 32 years. 
Ironically, one of the people who had trouble believing that ideas would 
conquer special interests was the late William Meckling. In one of the last 
lengthy conversations I had with him, in 1979, Meckling was playing “ain’t 
it awful,” lamenting what he saw as the inevitable decline of liberty. 
Although I agreed with him about his facts, I argued that because of good, 
intellectually powerful people like him taking action in the public arena, the 
decline was not inevitable.  
 
Meckling: What do you mean? 
Henderson: Look back at your whole life’s work since you 
became an economist. What were the two policy issues on 
which you weighed in and spent substantial time? 
Meckling: Well, that would be in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, when I wanted to make sure the federal 
government didn’t get a monopoly on satellites in space 
and in the late 1960s, when I was with the Gates 
Commission. 
Henderson: And what happened? 
Meckling (looking sheepish): Well, the government did 
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